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At the Heard Museum in Phoenix Arizona, on a panel in
the entry to the artifacts area, there is a statement by an
Indian from the Taos Pueblo in the appeal for the return
of Blue Lake:1
We have lived upon this land from days beyond
history’s records, far past any living memory,
deep into the time of legend.  The story of my
people and the story of this place are one single
story.  No man can think of us without thinking
of this place.  We are always joined together.
Frank Tenorio, Tribal Leader of the San Felipe Pueblo,
made the following observation:
There has been a lot said about the sacredness of
our land, which is our body, and the value of our
culture, which is our soul.  But water is the
blood of our tribes, and if its life-giving flow is
stopped, or it is polluted, all else will die and the
many thousands of years of our communal
existence will come to an end.
In treaty negotiations with the Chippewas Indians in
1826, Thomas L. McKenney told the tribes:
You are never to forget that this is a great gift.
It comes from your GREAT FATHER himself,
who sends it to you by our hands.  It is a new
heart.  Your GREAT FATHER has told us to
come up here, and put it in the breast of his
great Chippeway children.  No bad blood
belongs to this heart.  It is an American heart,
and is full of good blood; and if you will open
your ears and listen well, and never forget your
GREAT FATHER’S  message, it will make you
all happy.2
Recently, in the Sunday supplement to the Washington
Post, the Washington Post Magazine, Senator John
McCain, immediate past Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, states that when Dances
with Wolves came out, everyone wanted on the Indian
committee; now, they can’t get a quorum for the lack of
interest in Indian affairs.  This propensity for cycles was
observed in 1989, during testimony before the Select
Committee on Indian Affairs in the United States Senate.
Former special consultant to President Nixon, Mr.
Leonard Garment, observed that interest in Indian affairs
was much like the reoccurrence of the infestation of
cicadas in the Washington area at the time.  Like the
cicadas, every 17 years or so, the United States takes
notice and makes a big racket about Indian issues then
lets the feeling recede.  
What the above references acknowledge is the futility of
wishing Indians away, and the propensity of the United
States to make and break grand promises, and then do no
penance.  Through history the United States has
schizophrenically extolled the virtues of Indians and
Indian culture to represent many aspects of our heritage
and mythology  - towns, cities and states named for
Indians or form Indian language descriptions, the movies;
never mind the Washington Redskins or the Atlanta
Braves.  All the while praying that Indians would quietly
go away.  In that vein, the United States has chosen to
selectively forget its legal and contractual obligations
contained in its treaties with Indian tribes.  This
convenient blindness to treaty obligations is one of the
more hypocritical elements of federal Indian policy.
Policy makers tend to prefer to foster the erroneous
perception that all Indian issues revolve around welfare
issues - or worse -  issues of redress for past Indian
suffering.  All that has been asked of the United States by
Indians is for the United States to live up to its
contractual and fiduciary obligations.  
Not only does the United States not fulfill those fiduciary
functions and obligations to Indians, but there is a
distinct lack of cultural understanding from the Federal
Government in dealing with Indians and Indian tribes
that contributes in large degree to the failure.  There is a
tendency - and this includes BIA - to think of Indian
tribes in terms of how they behave and relate in their
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activities with the Federal Government.  This myopia has
not only frustrated the Federal Government’s ability to
dialogue with Indian tribes, but has limited the ability of
Indian tribes to communicate the full breadth and scope
of their needs.  While it is true that the experience of the
last 125 to 150 years has influenced the Indian
understanding and culture, it is also true that much of the
traditional culture and structure of Indian tribes remains
intact, notwithstanding the historical efforts of the United
States to extinguish those cultures. 
So we see that Federal officials, politicians and Indians
all understand that the United States barely lives up to its
obligations to Indians.  It is within this context that the
Federal Government began in the early 80's to seriously
address the issue of settling Indian reserved water rights
claims. The earliest efforts began in the Reagan
administration as result of efforts to resolve Indian water
issues in Arizona. There was a concern regarding how
the Federal Government was to reconcile resolving the
inequities of the Ak Chin settlement, the Southern
Arizona Water Right Settlement, with the potential
impacts on the Central Arizona Project.  At the same time
in another arena, the Justice department was actively
pursuing the Wind River claims before the State courts in
Wyoming.  In both cases, because of the potential
disruption to non-Indian water users and the States’ legal
apparatus for water, there were extensive discussions
among federal, state, local, and Indian representatives as
to how to foster negotiated settlements of Indian water
claims.  Both events were related in their similar effect on
non-Indian water users.  Both events served to raise the
anxiety of non-Indian water users and the Federal
Government regarding the adverse impacts of meeting
the water rights claims of Indian tribes.   After decades of
using water unchallenged, non-Indian water users saw
the potential for extensive disruption to longstanding
corporate and family businesses.  In many cases, the non-
Indians never had a notion that what they perceived as
property rights were subject to dissolution. The states saw
a major challenge to what they believed to be their
sovereign rights.  
Any discussion about Indian water settlements requires a
statement about the value of negotiated settlements.  It is
important to understand what a negotiated settlement
contributes to an Indian water rights claim that litigating
the claim does not.  First, dispense with the past
statements as to the reduced cost of negotiated settlements
versus litigation.  While my numbers come from
imprecise data, it was estimated that the Wind River
litigation  ( first settled in 1990) cost the Federal
Government approximately $14.0 million.  A survey of
past settlements will confirm that the litigation was
decidedly less costly than negotiated settlements.  In
addition to the settlement funding, negotiated settlements
require similar complexity in technical work and
investigations, such that there is no real cost savings in
prosecuting a settlement.  Therefore, it should be taken as
a given that pursuing negotiated settlements requires the
same financial effort as litigating the same claim.  
So, why negotiate.  Consider the outcome of the Wind
River litigation.  After the Wyoming courts ruled in 1990,
there was an immediate effort to appeal.  The Wyoming
Supreme Court affirmed the water allocations, and the
parties began to fight over interpretation of the court
opinion and administrative issues that were created by the
case but were not settled in the case, since those issues
were not under consideration.  As a result, 3 more years
of litigation ensued, including a trip to the United States
Supreme Court.  Is the issue settled?  No, but negotiations
are ongoing.  Therefore, one large advantage of
negotiated settlements is the opportunity to resolve many
of the outstanding administrative issues that accompany
the use of water by the tribe.  As the water rights are
quantified, the issues of jurisdiction in administration,
procedures for sharing shortages, etc. can be addressed.
The most valuable result of a negotiated settlement is the
establishment of commercial and governmental
relationships which remain after the negotiations are
concluded.  In most cases, water rights negotiations are
the first substantive opportunity for the local non-Indian
community to begin to understand and appreciate the
needs and capabilities of their Indian neighbors.  While
the foregoing illustrates the value of negotiated
settlements, litigation retains a threshold consideration.
Without litigation, there is little compulsion to negotiate.
A noted example is the Warm Springs negotiation in
Oregon.  With the absence of a general stream
adjudication or similar court proceeding to raise the
intensity of the negotiations, the talks have gone on for
15 years, and are still in progress.  
The Reagan Administration established the policy that
negotiated settlements were preferable to litigation.  In
that spirit, Ann McLaughlin, Under Secretary for the
Department of the Interior, chose to make Indian water
settlements one of her main initiatives.  She was assisted
in her efforts by Mr. Mike Clinton, a man not only large
in person, but in ambition and vision.  During that
period, a model was evolving that would provide structure
to Indian water settlement negotiations whereby the
Department could integrate all its resources, and address
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more than one settlement at a time.  The challenge was to
determine how to bring settlement issues to the policy
decision makers, and how to structure the policy debate.
 
An early indication of Administration thinking came in
1982 with the President’s veto of the first Southern
Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act.  In his justification
for the veto, President Reagan articulated the principle
that the Federal Government should not support
negotiated settlements in which the Federal Government
is not a participant, nor should the Federal Government
support settlements that do not require non-Indians
contributing an equitable share of the costs.  
The participation of the Under Secretary added an
additional dimension to the negotiation effort.  While
high level officials in the Department had negotiated
settlements in the past, never before had the Office of the
Secretary brought its full weight to the effort.  This was
important for two reasons.  First, the Secretary was
saying that Indian water rights settlements were
important.  This had the effect of the putting
Departmental agencies on notice that they, in addition to
BIA, had to take Indian water rights seriously.  Second,
Ann McLaughlin did not suffer fools graciously.  Her
interest set the agenda in this issue and energized the
entire Departmental resources towards its success.  With
the partnership of Assistant Secretary  for Indian Affairs,
Ross Swimmer and BIA Deputy Commissioner Pat
Ragsdale, an intellectual team not seen before was
created.  
With this policy team in place, the Administration
negotiated the follow-on Ak Chin settlement in 1984, and
the Colorado Ute settlement in 1986.  These settlements
began to establish  the model of joining Indian
settlements to Reclamation projects.  Since Reclamation
controls much of the water movement in many basins in
the West, this evolution was a natural and ironic one.  In
fact, the Colorado Ute settlement has almost lost its
identity in its relationship with the Bureau of
Reclamation’s Animas-La Plata Project in southwestern
Colorado.  While there is endless debate as to the
feasibility of a Reclamation project, and the
appropriateness of the water rights settlement, there is no
more graphic illustration of the value - and distortion of
value - that the marriage of a non-Indian project with
Indian water right settlements can present.  It is in this
case that the reality of the politics of non-Indian water
users in Indian water settlements is best illustrated.
Without the added benefit of settling the Ute Mountain
Ute and Southern Ute tribes water rights claims, Animas-
La Plata would not be a viable project today - but non-
Indian parties have their project.3
By 1988, the Department had laid the groundwork to
settle a number of Indian water settlements.  However, by
this time Ann McLaughlin had gone on to become
Secretary of Labor and Mike Clinton had left the Federal
Government to pursue a career in private industry. As a
result, there were a number of issues “hanging” between
the Department and OMB.  One issue was OMB’s
response to a November 10, 1986 memorandum from
Secretary Hodel to James Miller, Director of OMB.  In
that memorandum, the Secretary laid out the nucleus of
policy and procedures in negotiating financial settlements
in the water arena.  While the memorandum dealt largely
with the larger issue of cost-sharing on Reclamation
projects, it also had broad application to financial issues
for Indian water rights settlements.  While the
memorandum prescribed a number of policies which were
designed to protect the Federal Government, the
overarching theme was coordination and communication
with OMB on settlement activities.  Another issue was
the constant insistance from OMB that a set group of
criteria and procedures be established to guide federal
participation in Indian water rights negotiations.  
All the effort through 1988 had offered some lessons.
One lesson learned was the need for coordination of
activities within the Department of the Interior and the
Federal Government.  When the components of a
settlement were coming into focus, depending upon what
those elements were, e.g. diminishment of the trust asset,
use of Reclamation facilities, provisions for using public
lands, etc. the different policy offices - each Assistant
Secretary - had to be briefed and consulted.  Given the
schedules of the Assistant Secretaries, the coordination
cost significant and critical  time.  This loss of time was
critical because of the elements that  typically accompany
the need for policy guidance, and further negotiations for
the settlement.  
Another lesson learned concerned the conflict that was
inherent in coordinating and persuading external
agencies, particularly OMB, of the advisability of the
settlement.  OMB has long taken the position that the
United States should not fund a settlement for an amount
greater than the United States’ legal liability, which due
to statute of limitations, was usually zero.  Further, the
Department of Justice was a primary partner, due to its
interests in the claims, and the requirement for the
Attorney General to sign the stipulations to the courts
when the claims were extinguished.  The model and the
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goal were becoming clear.  If the Department of the
Interior could create an apparatus that would focus all the
policy constituents in the Department of the Interior on a
propose Indian water rights settlement, the Secretary
would have the benefit of a coordinated, documented and
defendable settlement.  
All of the experiences and lessons from the Reagan
Administration were fresh and current when the Bush
Administration arrived in 1989.  One of the earliest
mandates from the Bush White house was for Secretary
Lujan and the Department of the Interior to establish an
overarching water policy structure.  At the same time, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs, as well
as the Division of Indian Affairs in the Solicitor’s Office,
was agitating for a Indian water committee, or a similar
structure for Indian water settlements.  In addition, OMB
was calling for continued discussions regarding firm
policies for negotiating Indian water rights settlements.
As a result, the Working Group on Indian Water
Settlements was established, and Mr. Tim Glidden,
Counselor to the Secretary, was made its Chair.  
Talks with the Office of Management and Budget
regarding the valuation of settlements and the budgeting
of settlements had begun late in 1988.  With the arrival
of Secretary Lujan, talks had been tabled during the
transition period.  With the creation of the Working
Group, discussions with OMB were renewed.  There had
been a longstanding debate between Interior and OMB
regarding the appropriateness of Indian settlements that
possessed Federal contributions above and beyond legal
liabilities constrained by statute of limitations.  The
Department had long taken the position that settlements
that settled longstanding claims in which the parties paid
for the benefits received was appropriate.  In the June 21,
1989 signing statement by President Bush on the
Puyallup land settlement, the President committed to a set
of criteria and procedures for Indian water and land
settlements.  
On March 12, 1990, Mr. Glidden published a policy
statement to be known as the Criteria and Procedures for
Participation of the Federal Government in Negotiations
for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims.  The
Criteria and Procedures were negotiated with OMB and
the Department of Justice to form the skeleton for the
water rights effort in the Federal Government.  As a
general matter, they were roundly criticized by non-
Indians and Indian country alike.  There is not sufficient
space to analyze the meanings and value of the Criteria
and Procedures, except to say that, while they have been
universally condemned, no one to date has had the
courage to undo or amend them, not because they are
perfect, but because they allow flexibility where needed,
and sometimes it is best to accept “yes” for an answer.  
What evolved in the Bush Administration was a structure
designed to negotiate as many as 20 settlements at one
time.  The intent was to put enough teams in the field that
Indian country could see movement towards their
individual claims.  In order to facilitate that effort, a
number of procedures were created to integrate the
negotiation process with the larger Federal Governmental
apparatus.  First, a Fact-Finding Report was mandated
that was designed to evaluate the potential for a
successful negotiation, and to the lay the factual
groundwork for subsequent analysis of a settlement.
Ultimately, it was decided that the Fact-Finding Report
should be  developed in consensus with all stakeholders
in the negotiations. With the publication of the Fact-
Finding report, the Working Group was initially briefed
and informed about the potential for settlement.  Also at
that time, the negotiation team was given first-time
instructions on the negotiation.  
Following the Fact-Finding Report, given the appropriate
time, and depending upon complexity and resources, an
Assessment Report was provided by the team.  This
confidential report was generally a worst case/best case
assessment of the outcome of the negotiations, and was
the basis for a final charge to the negotiation team to
complete the negotiations.  Since this report contained the
basis for recommending a Federal position, it was the
subject of a great deal of analysis by the Department,
OMB, and Justice.  It usually caused the greatest amount
of debate.  Ultimately the debates distilled down to the
contrast between a Federal position that adhered rigidly
to academic criteria established in the abstract versus the
realities of a position that would facilitate consensus for
settlement among all the parties.  
Anyone who has ever negotiated anything knows that
negotiations never follow clean linear paths.  However,
with the Criteria and Procedures, the ideal had been
established.  As a result, the burden for justifying waiver
or exception to the Criteria and Procedures was placed on
the team chairs and were exceedingly heavy.  Any
exception was thoughtfully considered by the Working
Group.  The first settlement to be negotiated completely
under the Criteria and Procedures was the Northern
Cheyenne Settlement.  Until the arrival of the Clinton
Administration, the Indian water rights process was a
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continual refinement of the Working Group and Criteria
and Procedures process.  
In the period from 1982 to 1992, the Federal Government
negotiated and legislated 14 Indian water  settlements.
No two were exactly alike, but all sought to structure
settlements in such a way as to limit the adverse impacts
that redistribution of water entails, leave tribes with wet
water which would foster economic development on the
reservations, and resolve, for all time, the water claims.
These settlements were designed to minimize detriment
to all concerned; a fact that illustrates the central point of
Indian water rights settlements; the settlements are as
much for the benefit of non-Indian water users as for the
tribes.  
How well did the original Working Group process work?
By most accounts, the Working Group served its purpose.
In fact, in some ways the Working Group succeeded too
well.  By 1990, the Federal Government was having
sufficient success in negotiating settlements, that many
tribes who had been traditionally skeptical and suspicious
that settlements were subterfuge to rob tribes of water,
were beginning to believe that the United States was
capable of rectifying past mistakes, albeit belatedly and at
a slow pace.  As a result, request for negotiation teams
began to accelerate.  While the new trust was positive, it
was becoming apparent that the Department had a
problem. 
Actually, a number of problems.  It became obvious that
the Department, OMB, and Justice were capable of
addressing only a limited number of settlements at any
one time.  Funding was not keeping up with the increased
demand for technical studies and analysis needed for
negotiations.  Funding was not sufficient to support the
participation of the tribes.  The Department was having
trouble finding experienced chairs for the negotiation
teams capable of carrying the increased negotiation
schedules.  The Administration and the Congress were
limited in their ability to analyze an increasing number of
simultaneous negotiations.  And OMB - as well as the
Congress - was getting very uncomfortable with the
financial demands that increased settlement costs put on
the budget.  By 1992, there were discussions regarding
how to better manage an increasing number of requests
for negotiations.  
In 1993, the Clinton Administration arrived.  While
Secretary Babbitt had served as Governor of the State of
Arizona, and an attorney who represented a tribe in a
water rights settlement, the Department was slow to
develop a policy and plan for addressing settlement of
Indian water rights claims.  There is a number of reasons
for the slow start.  
One of the reasons may not be clearly evident to those
who follow Indian policy in the Federal Government.
Unlike past Secretaries, Secretary Babbitt took a new and
different approach to the roles of the Department’s
Assistant Secretaries.  While the Assistant Secretaries
have traditionally been the translators of Administration
policy to the Department’s agencies, with the Babbitt
Administration, that role was given to the Agency heads.
The Assistant Secretaries were now charged with special
projects that were of paramount importance to the
Secretary.  So, you have Assistant Secretary Rieke
representing the Administration in resolving the Bay-
Delta solution, and Assistant Secretary Frampton
representing the Secretary in the resolution of the
Everglades issues.  In the case of Indian water rights,
John Duffy, Counselor to the Secretary, dealt with all
policy matters related to Indian water rights.  The critical
point here is that each functional role in the Department
was compartmentalized to be administered by these
individuals, who were rarely challenged in their roles.
Therefore, when John Duffy challenged the reallocation
of water contracted to the City of Kingman in order to
reserve water for Arizona Indian water negotiations, the
confusion between the larger policy issues on the lower
Colorado River became exacerbated through ignorance
and the lack of a structure to resolve conflicting policies.
The conflicts that ensued with the larger policy questions
regarding the Secretary’s role as water master for the
Colorado River quickly overshadowed the need for water
for tribes in Arizona.  As a result, the Secretary lost an
opportunity for water in a notoriously water short area.
In other words, the Working Group which could have
provided counsel on this issue, has not been of real value
because the management philosophy asserted that there
was no need to coordinate among the different policy
groups in the Department.  
Another reason for lack of achievement is the fact that
those settlements that were “in the pipeline” during the
80's and 90's had been consummated. It is a long
gestating process for a settlement to come to final
fruition.   During that period, the team, the Departments
of Interior and Justice, focus enormous amount of energy
on completing a settlement. This approach was a natural
result of economizing resources on the highest priority
settlements.  Until those settlements were completed,
other settlements were necessarily put on a slow tract
until resources were made available.   With the kind of
26
intensity and energy that accompanied those settlements,
it is reasonable to assume that there would be a breather
while the Federal Government took stock of its progress,
refreshed itself, dormant efforts were energized, and an
overall policy assessment was conducted.  Therefore,
settlements would take a hiatus while negotiations that
were on the slow track would ramped up for high
intensity effort.  
Another reason for lack of settlements in the Clinton
Administration is the unspoken policy of spending as few
Federal funds as possible in Indian water settlements.
While this policy, which has not been expressly
articulated, is a defensible fiscal policy, such a policy
clearly dampens any progress in Indian negotiations.
This is primarily the case because, 1) all non-federal
parties believe the United States is duplicitous in the
conflict, 2) the tribes believe that the United States, as
trustee, has an obligation to provide facilities with the
settlements, and 3) without Federal funding, the benefit
to non-Indian water users to negotiate is diminished.  It
is also true that Congress has complained about the cost
of negotiated settlements, which is not to say that, all
parties do not extol the virtues of negotiated settlements.
The most compelling reason that the Clinton
Administration has not found success in the Indian water
settlements is the lack of will to make settlements
happen.  At its most basic level, a negotiated settlement
is like making sausage.  You don’t know what’s in it, and
you don’t want to know how its made.  It is not a pretty
picture.  If the Administration is not dedicated to the
concept of negotiated settlements, it can not suffer
incongruity and irrational decision making that
accompanies participation in negotiated settlements, and
particularly Indian water rights settlements.  And
budgetary policy is part and parcel of the decision to
make settlements happen.  
So where do negotiated Indian water settlements go from
here?  It is not clear.  The politics of the budget debate
have obscured the realities of Federal budget and finance;
never mind the fiduciary responsibility to Indians.  The
institutional knowledge is slipping away; both in the
Executive Branch and the Congress.  With the arrival of
Slade Gorton and the Republicans, though not all, the
adversarial character of the Congress has significantly
risen.  Finally, the politics and the tension of water in the
West is steadily rising.  While the availability and
viability of water for growth, commerce, and the
environment in the West is debatable, there is no debate
about the amount of conflict that will be created as those
issues are resolved.  
In one overriding respect, the Federal Government is the
entity most responsible for the conflicts involving water
between Indians and non-Indians in the West.  The
Federal Government in the late 19th century was the
authoritative source for assessing the water needs of
Indians, understanding the meaning and intent of the
treaties, and possessing the power to prevent the ultimate
conflicts which would develop without vigilance by the
United States.  However, not only did the Federal
Government fail to say, “non-Indian water users can’t use
this water because it is needed for Indian reservations”,
but the Federal Government created programs - such as
the Reclamation program - which usurped Indians ability
to put their water to use, or to have the benefits of those
waters for other life sustaining purposes.  In other words,
the Federal Government is responsible.  Not because the
Federal Government is a welfare agency, not because the
Federal Government should redress sins of the past 125
years - although that is not a bad argument - but because
the Federal Government has a treaty, contractual,
fiduciary, trustee obligation which it has yet to fulfill.  
So what does the Clinton Administration do for the
future?  First and foremost, the Administration needs to
decide if it wants to pursue negotiated settlements.  If not,
it should say so, and raise the litigation budgets of BIA
and Justice.  At the risk of having deja vu all over again,
it was increased litigation risk that drove stakeholders to
negotiated settlements in the first place.  But maybe such
understandings as the value of negotiated settlements
have to cycle in order to reinforce the need for pursuing
them.  Otherwise, the Administration should get serious
with funding and putting committed, experienced
individuals in charge of energizing the effort.  
In order to have a credible Indian water rights trust asset
protection effort, the Administration needs to commit
$25.0 million a year to lay the technical groundwork that
is necessary for prosecuting or negotiating the claims
cases.  While there are other Departmental structures that
can work just as well, until something is decided, the
Department should reestablish the Working Group on
Indian Water Settlements as the Departmental
partnership and team that it was designed to be.  Further,
the Assistant Secretaries of the Department of the Interior
should be consulted as major policy counselors.  
What does the Congress do for the future?  Acknowledge
its sacred promises to Indian peoples.  John McCain has
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ENDNOTES
1, The People, Stephan Trimble
2. The Great Father, The United States Government and American Indians
3. The observation ignores the current discussions ongoing in Colorado concerning the fate of the Animas-La Plata
Project.  Any change will have to reconcile the benefits of the settlement to the Colorado Utes.
4.  There may be those who have read the preceding who believe that I have been overly harsh on the federal
government.  I agree that, in some instances, Indians have contributed as much to their problems as the failures of
the United States to fulfill its fiduciary role.  While I do not deny that Indians have had options in their existence,
the overwhelming evidence testifies to the overwhelming contribution of the United States to tribal suffering and
loss.
done so.  Daniel Inhoye has done so.  I presume Ben
Nighthorse Campbell has done so.   In his heyday as
Secretary, James Watt made one of his predictably inane
statements which betrayed a decided lack of
understanding for what he was charged with managing.
He stated that Indian policies were illustrations of the
United States’ failure at socialism.  He could not see that
historical Indian policies were and are illustrations of the
United States’ failure at being consistent and moral in its
dealings with other human beings, and living up to
contractual obligations.  Indians want self-determination;
they want the respect in self-government granted  their
ancestors.  How is that different from other Americans?
Not much, except in one overarching respect.  If Indian
peoples are to retain their culture without paying the
enormous price exacted over the last 150 to 200 years, the
Federal Government - ultimately Congress - has to live
up to its promises.  Something in short supply in recent
years.4
(The opinions expressed herein are solely those of Mr. Kenney, and are his responsibility.   No statements contained
herein are meant to be official representations of  the policy or positions of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Department
of the Interior, or the United States Government.) 
